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Case study Network analysis
Case Context
Vernal pool regulations in Maine
Vernal pool: seasonal wetlands that provide fishless breeding habitat for amphibian 
indicator species 
Case Context
Vernal pool regulations in Maine
Case Context
 Initial group of 6 met in 2010, grew to 52 by 2014
 Fed, state, town, developers, land trusts, university
 Developing a market-based, locally-tailored mechanism
Methods: Case Study
 Conducted 27 Interviews (2013)
 Attended 45 meetings (2010-2014)
 Collected documents, emails, press, web postings
 All data analyzed in Nvivo
for themes of power, trust & learning
Methods: Network analysis
Look at network patterns at actor and network levels
 Network links based on who co-attended meetings
 Data from same time period as interviews
 Analyzed in UCINET
Collaboration & Power
Is power equalized? If so, how?
 Network exchange theory
 Status characteristics theory
(Agranoff, 2006; Ansell & Gash, 2008; Bodin & Crona, 2009; Bramwell & 
Sharman, 1999; Johnston et al., 2011; Walker et al. 2000)
Collaboration & Power
Is power equalized? If so, how?
 Network exchange theory
 Status characteristics theory
(Agranoff, 2006; Ansell & Gash, 2008; Bodin & Crona, 2009; Bramwell & 




Collaboration & Power: Results
No actors stand out as most powerful
 Position as reason for power
“(Army Corps rep) seems to play an important role but that’s 
her institution - I mean she’s the biggest regulatory hammer 
in the room.”
- University rep
Collaboration & Power: Results
No actors stand out as most powerful
 Position as reason for power
 Status as reason for power 
Collaboration & Power: Results
No actors stand out as most powerful
 Position as reason for power
 Status as reason for power 
“(Town rep) is sort of the planning guru in the state of Maine. 
If we have a tool that he can promote, I think that would go a 
long way.”
-State rep
Collaboration & Power: Results
Collaboration & Power: Results
Freeman’s Network 
Centralization: 12.14%
Summary of Results: Power
Power
Theory Qualitative Network Analysis
Network exchange Some positions matter Power is equalized
Position not important




Does trust develop?  If so, how?
 Institutional rational choice 
theory
 Social psychology/Advocacy 
coalition framework
(Bodin, Crona, & Ernstson, 2006; Henry & Dietz, 2011; Leach & Sabatier, 2005; 
Lubell, 2007)
Collaboration & Trust
Does trust develop?  If so, how?
 Institutional rational choice 
theory





(Bodin, Crona, & Ernstson, 2006; Henry & Dietz, 2011; Leach & Sabatier, 2005; 
Lubell, 2007)
Collaboration & Trust: Results
Trust not a problem
 Institutional rational choice: recent & past experiences
“I don’t really trust local governments to follow through with 
these things. Then again, I don’t trust us or the State to follow 
through with (conservation) either. I haven’t seen a good track 
record by anybody to do that.”
-Federal rep
Collaboration & Trust: Results
Trust not a problem
 Institutional rational choice: recent & past experiences
 Institutional ‘rules’ mediated experiences
“It’s really kudos to (the facilitators) for infusing and informing 
the process with a commitment to actually do this in as open 
and inclusive way as is possible, without which there would be 
no trust.”
-Town rep
Collaboration & Trust: Results
Trust not a problem
 Institutional rational choice: recent & past experiences
 Institutional ‘rules’ mediated experiences
 Core beliefs not influencing trust formation
“The other reason not to have involved (environmental advocacy 
groups) - I think it would have been harder, probably not 
impossible, but harder to build that level of trust. 
-State rep
Collaboration & Trust: Results
Network Analysis
Overall density: 0.457
Collaboration & Trust: Results
Network Analysis
Overall density: 0.457
ANOVA results: Within-group ties not 
significantly different than random network
Summary of Results: Trust
Trust
Theory Qualitative Network Analysis
Institutional rational 
choice
Experiences and “rules” 
important
Density builds trust
Advocacy Coalition Core beliefs not relevant
No advocacy groups
No evidence of 
homophily
Collaboration & Learning
Does learning occur?  If so, 
how?
 Social cognition/Collective 
learning theory
(Connick & Innes, 2003; Gerlak & Heikkila, 2011; Newig et. al., 2010; Pennington, 2008)
Collaboration & Learning
Does learning occur?  If so, 
how?





(Connick & Innes, 2003; Gerlak & Heikkila, 2011; Newig et. al., 2010; Pennington, 2008)
Collaboration & Learning: Results
Both personal & collective learning has occurred
“It evolved as a widening circle…from a core group of wildlife 
biologists and planners, to economic developers to local 
decision makers, and of course regulators were part of that early 
widening out.  As that’s happened, ideas have been introduced 
or complications have been introduced, pitfalls have been 
brought up that have to be overcome, and so the ideas evolved 
too.”
-Town rep
Collaboration & Learning: Results
Both personal & collective learning has occurred
 Mechanisms for collective learning
 Institutional
“I would say I’m not sure I know enough to help you.  
(Facilitator) said “that’s alright you’ll bring a different 
perspective,” which I thought was good for her to look at it that 
way.”
-Land Trust rep
Collaboration & Learning: Results
Both personal & collective learning has occurred
 Mechanisms for collective learning
 Institutional
 Individual characteristics
“I listen to them because I think it’s fact based, and I think that 
they are interested in knowing how these pools actually function 
in the landscape. They’re not ideological in their approach…I 
think they’d be willing to alter their views of things if the facts 
took them there.”
-Town rep
Collaboration & Learning: Results
Network Analysis
Freeman’s Centralization score: 12.14 %
Density: 0.457
 Many connections, without central actors
Summary of Results
Learning
Theory Qualitative Network Analysis

























































Towns of Topsham and Orono, ME
Local developer & land trusts representatives
Maine Departments of: 
- Inland Fisheries & Wildlife
- Environmental Protection
- Agriculture, Conservation & Forestry
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
US Environmental Protection Agency
US Fish & Wildlife Service
Supported by National Science Foundation 
award EPS-0904155 to Maine EPSCOR 
Sustainability Solutions Initiative 
at the University of Maine










Land Trust 44.5 65.6
Collaboration & Power: Results
Organization type Stakeholder interest
University (4) Ecology (6)
State (3) Governance (4)
Town (3) Economics (2)
Federal (1) None (1)
Developer (1)
Consultant (1)
Actors with above average centrality (more influential)
Collaboration & Learning: Results
Collective learning theory
 Both personal & collective learning has occurred
“To me a vernal pool was something I wanted to run a bulldozer 
over every April so it didn’t exist anymore because I didn’t 
understand…I don’t quite think that way anymore, I go “Okay, 
that’s an important part of an ecosystem. What do we do?”
-Development rep
Collaboration & Trust: Results
Network Analysis
Overall density: 0.457
Economics Ecology Planning None
Economics 92 168 119 28
Ecology 168 707 449 77
Planning 117 447 254 56
None 28 76 56 6
Sum of tie strengths within and between interest groups
ANOVA results: Within-group ties not significantly 
different than random network
Power
Theory Qualitative Network Analysis
Network exchange Some positions matter Power is equalized
Position not important
Status characteristics Status is more important Not tested
Learning
Theory Qualitative Network Analysis
Collective learning Personal & collective Decentralized
Dense




Theory Qualitative Network Analysis
Institutional rational choice Experiences and “rules” 
important
Density builds trust
Advocacy Coalition Core beliefs not relevant
No advocacy groups
No evidence of homophily

